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Abstract
Despite the fact that disasters, usually induced by hurricanes, were a near-annual
experience in the nineteenth-century British-controlled Caribbean, the immediate
response of white elites (plantation owners and colonial officers) to these events has
remained largely underexamined. This article fills that lacuna by examining the con-
cerns that, across the long nineteenth century, informed British responses to some
of the most devastating nature-induced disasters in this period. Though the dam-
ages wrought by these events always necessitated some form of humanitarian relief,
across the period 1831–1907 the survival of labor regimes and the plantation economy
always remained the paramount concern of British officials. White elites viewed their
minority control over colonies in the region as contingent on their ability to make
African-Caribbean people labor for them. Consequently, because disasters so often
destroyed plantations and other sites of labor, colonial responses to disaster were pri-
marily informed by a desire to coerce the African-Caribbean population back to work.
Reflecting a preoccupation with “idleness” that was mirrored in domestic poor relief
and disaster relief throughout the British Empire, white elites often attempted to with-
hold needed foodstuffs and materials for rebuilding from the African-Caribbean pop-
ulation until they re-engaged in labor for the colonial state. This article, through show-
ing that a preoccupation with idleness remained central to colonial disaster response,
reveals an underexamined continuity between the eras of slavery and emancipation.
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Studying disaster response in the British Caribbean permits a unique and new
perspective on the continuities between the eras of slavery and emancipation.
Broadly speaking, scholars who have examined the postemancipation period
have tended to focus on the plantation and what Woodville K. Marshall has
termed the “post-emancipation labour problem” (Marshall 2003:115). Those
scholars have largely debated whether the formerly enslaved were “pushed”
or “pulled” from the plantation after they were emancipated. That said, there
has been some agreement that the formerly enslaved population were, after
abolition and apprenticeship, able to draw on some new, albeit limited, free-
doms. Following the ending of apprenticeship, there appears to have been a
gendered diversification of opportunity as men focused on agricultural labor
andwomen, in addition to familial and domestic work, were able to exert some
limited independence selling agricultural produce and other items as market
traders (Yelvington et al. 2011:301). Although the British still retained a great
deal of power, they certainly lost their previously totalizing grip over labor.
It must be said that for those scholars who have posited that the formerly
enslaved were able exert new freedoms there are also those such as Nigel Bol-
land who have urged for more cautious assessments. Bolland has argued that
historians should not paint “too extreme a discontinuity” in African-Caribbean
lives “before and after” 1838 (Brereton 2002:8). In the same vein, this article
shows that whilst British approaches to disaster relief were never formally
codified, there were organizing principles that remained constant, meaning
it followed an observable pattern throughout the period 1831–1907. The most
prominent organizing principle was white fear of an African-Caribbean pop-
ulation rendered “idle.” When disasters destroyed and disrupted the sites and
rhythms of labor, white elites became anxious about the prospect of an idle
African-Caribbean population. They feared that, without the disciplining force
of labor, this population would mount a challenge to their authority.
Though a large-scale contestation of colonial authority never took place
following a disaster in the long nineteenth century, the disruption of labor
appears to have always precipitated the fear of one. During the early nine-
teenth century, successive rebellions in Barbados (1816), Demerara (1823), and
Jamaica (1831/32) are a clear reason why this fear remained constant. However,
understanding why that fear remained pervasive throughout the long nine-
teenth century is only possible when one considers that, as Bridget Brereton
argues, social distance and racial hegemony were crucial “social and cultural
weapons” at the disposal of Whites in their fight to maintain their control of
the Caribbean colonies without the “buttress of slave ownership” (Brereton
2011:338). Both social distance and racial hegemony were placed under serious
stress in the aftermaths of disasters.
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The organizing principle at the heart of British “relief” is how this idleness
was responded to. Showing a correlationwith the punitive traditions of domes-
tic poor relief and practices deployed throughout the Empire, white elites
across this period sought to control relief by limiting distribution only to those
who engaged in work for the colonial state. Initially, in the early nineteenth
century, as domestic poor relief was in the process of evolving, its linkages to
colonial disaster relief were less pronounced. In 1834 the Poor Law Amend-
ment Act was passed in Parliament; it emerged out of an ongoing dialog in
British society that sought to make work the central determinant of a per-
son’s eligibility for relief and to make claiming relief itself an option of last
resort. In the Caribbean, limiting relief to those willing to work was seen by
Whites as vital because work was conceived of as a disciplining force on an
African-Caribbean population rendered idle and whom, without it, might turn
against their colonial oppressors. There were rare exceptions where the history
of white and African-Caribbean conflict stymied this approach or where coop-
eration between the groups took place. But, over the long nineteenth century,
British responses to disaster increasingly drew on the language of domestic
policy toward the poor explicitly. By the end of the nineteenth century, when
the British Caribbean experienced a spate of disasters, colonial governors were
writing about relief and, through the use of phrases such as “able-bodied,”
deciding who should and should not receive aid.
In the spirit of Small Islands, LargeQuestions, this articlewill further broaden
our understanding of the postemancipation era by highlighting the underex-
amined continuities in white elite approaches to disaster relief in both the eras
of slavery and notional freedom.1 Examinations of isolated cases of British dis-
aster relief have been completed by David Lambert (2005:117–84) and Simon
Smith (2011 and 2012). In his book onwhite identity on Barbados, Lambert cov-
ers the aftermath of a hurricane that hit the island in 1831 and highlights white
preoccupation with an idle African-Caribbean population. Of particular inter-
est is his suggestion that the posthurricane desolation represented a “testing
ground for the black capacity for freedom” and that their perceived idleness in
that moment reinforced white Barbadian opposition to their freedom (Lam-
bert 2005:182). Lambert’s argument is important because it hints at one aspect
this article explores in greater detail. Namely, that disasters created disruption
temporarily freeing African-Caribbeans from some strictures of colonial con-
1 Small Islands, Large Questions, edited by Karen Fog Olwig (1995), is a collection of essays
that attempted to broaden out the historiographical focus from the era of slavery to the post-
emancipation era. This collection also placed emphasis onnot just investigating the changing
dynamics of plantation labor during the transition between these two eras.
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trol and that Whites feared that without the re-imposition of work, change
in circumstance could become permanent. Smith, drawing on the concept of
vulnerability from the discipline of disaster risk reduction, has taken a more
interdisciplinary approach and studied both the disaster response and recov-
ery on St. Vincent in 1812 and 1831. While he makes a valuable contribution to
this topic of study, the factors underpinning and shaping British responses to
disaster remain underexamined in his work. Though the work of both Lam-
bert and Smith has some overlap with the content of this article, neither has
explored the organizing principles and continuities of British relief across the
long nineteenth century.
The only scholar to have undertaken a long form study of British Caribbean
disaster response is Matthew Mulcahy in his book Hurricanes and Society in
the Greater British Caribbean. Though the book’s temporal focus is the eigh-
teenth century,Mulcahy’s work is nonetheless a critical primer for understand-
ing relief in the long nineteenth century. He shows that from when the plan-
tation and enslaved labor became established parts of Caribbean society, for
white elites hurricanes began to precipitate fear not just of their ownmortality
but also of social unrest and ultimately African-Caribbean rebellion (Mulcahy
2006:141–88). Suggesting a continuity from the seventeenth to the nineteenth
century, Mulcahy shows that to allay those fears, the restoration of the planta-
tions was a frequent postdisaster priority and that their owners were usually
the main beneficiaries of financial aid when it was supplied by the British Par-
liament. Sherry Johnson, in her bookClimate andCatastrophe, shows that these
problems were not unique to the British Caribbean. Disaster triggered similar
anxieties in the ruling Spanish colonial class. In the period of Charles IV’s rule,
colonial officials regularly prioritized political concerns far ahead of human-
itarian concerns (Johnson 2011:168–71). Together, though examining different
empires, Mulcahy’s and Johnson’s work gestures toward a common experience
of disaster in the colonial Caribbean that instead of bringing societies together
exposed their racial, social, and political fault lines.
It is these similarities in the experience of disaster across Caribbean empires
that Stuart Schwartz has sought to illuminate in his book Sea of Storms.
Schwartz’s book takes a broad focus both temporally and geographically span-
ning pre-Columbian experiences through to Hurricane Katrina, and events
across the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Schwartz covers responses to the
Barbadian hurricane of 1831 and draws much the same conclusions as Lam-
bert, namely, that the aftermath of the hurricane gave white elites a vision
of what they most feared: “a slave population not subject to their command”
(Schwartz 2015:138). However, given that his focus is not specifically on the
British, he understandably roots his explanation of these fears, and the repres-
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sion meted out to allay them, in the context of the history of slave uprisings in
the Caribbean. Schwartz is right to do so, but, as this article shows, it was not
the case that the British feared that disasters would provoke uprisings directly.
Rather, they feared that, without work, the African-Caribbean would slump
into idleness that would in turn lead to them challenging white control. Thus,
informed by domestic attitudes to pauperism, the British placed work at the
heart of their approach to disaster relief.
Bonham C. Richardson, in his study of Barbados and the Windwards at the
end of the nineteenth century, provides an important examination of one of
the later disasters considered in this article: the 1898 hurricane that primarily
affectedBarbados andSt.Vincent (Richardson 1997). Richardson’s examination
of the event is valuable because it shows that Parliamentary aid given to the
islands fitted into a larger plan to lift the region out of economic depression.
The focus of his work is the political debates that determined the scope of this
financial aid and not the responses of those white elites on the ground in Bar-
bados and St. Vincent. This article expands existing coverage of events in the
affected islands and illuminates the organizing principles underpinning British
relief over the long nineteenth century.
It focuses on the islandswhich experienced the severest disasters in the long
nineteenth century: Barbados, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, and Jamaica.
On all these islands white elites were entirely reliant on African-Caribbean
plantation labor for their continued extraction of profit. Even when there
was a dire need to provide humanitarian relief, the survival of the planta-
tion economy and the labor regime which supported it always remained the
paramount concern of British officials. Reflecting preoccupations that were
shared throughout Britain, its empire and America, colonial officials focused
their energies on returning those who had been rendered idle by the destruc-
tion of their sites of labor back to work (Sawislak 1995:69–120). Where other
scholars have highlighted this preoccupation in their studies of individual dis-
asters, this article foregrounds the continuity of colonial concerns around idle-
ness.
1 The Intersection of Food, Labor, and Relief
The destruction of their homes, plantations and other sites of labor frequently
drove African-Caribbean peoples, in large groups, to the urban centers of
colonies searching for food and shelter. For white elites, these mass move-
ments often sparked fear. Large gatherings of African-Caribbean people had
always been something to be quickly dispersed lest they pose a threat to white
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minority rule. During the period of slavery, enslaved peoples had their free-
dom of movement constrained by a system of passes that prevented them
from leaving their plantation without the permission of the overseer or owner
of the plantation. Those found outside of their plantation without a pass
were at the very least quickly returned to their owner. When this system of
passes ended following Emancipation, police forces were set up throughout
the British Caribbean to continue to provide them with a method to disperse
gatherings (Bolland 1981:121). Consequently, across the longnineteenth century,
white response to disaster usually prioritized preventing large gatherings of
the African-Caribbean population, limiting their freedom of movement, and
where possible returning them to their traditionally rural places of work. How-
ever, this approach had obvious limitations in that whilst it temporarily allayed
their fears of insurrection and civil unrest, it alone would not reinstate the sta-
tus quo they desired; the sites and rhythms of labor remained destroyed. This
disruption of normalcy often caused migrations of African-Caribbean people
to urban centers bringing about the very gatherings thewhite elites feared. Fur-
thermore, the damage occasioned by disaster often created specific issues that,
beyond the transgressions of informal rules around space andmovement, were
perceived as threatening the colonial hierarchy.
The region’s natural hazards very frequently destroyed not only the plan-
tations and their cane crop, but also the provision grounds allotted to the
African-Caribbean population. Inmost British Caribbean colonies, plantations
dominated nearly all arable land and so these provision groundswere an essen-
tial source of food for African-Caribbean peoples. Consequently, in nearly all
the cases of disaster in the nineteenth century their destruction appeared to
have precipitated significant food shortages.2 However, the perceived threat
posed by this destruction went deeper. The provision ground as well as the
plantation was a site of labor and, in the British Caribbean, labor, even after
the period of slavery, was perceived as crucial to maintaining control over the
African-Caribbean population.
White desire for a cheap and expendable labor force was the reason African
peoples were first brought to the region, and centuries of racist rhetoric rein-
forced that as “property,” laboring was their central function in Caribbean soci-
ety (Beckles 2012:56–67). Thus, disaster, and the destruction of plantations,
often created a twofold crisis for white elites. Plantations were both the central
2 Food shortages were reported, and external sources of food were secured after the eruption
of La Soufrière in both 1812 and 1902, hurricanes in 1831, 1834, 1866, 1898, and following the
Kingston earthquake of 1907.
Downloaded from Brill.com05/01/2020 09:42:10AM
via free access
british disaster “relief” in the caribbean 1831–1907 207
New West Indian Guide 93 (2019) 201–230
site for African-Caribbean labor and, as they were also the site of their allot-
ments, their main source of food. Consequently, white elites were faced not
only with a population that needed feeding, but one that they could not easily
put back to work. Reflecting the need of the white elite to feel in control of the
postdisaster situation, across the nineteenth century relief in the Caribbean
thus became a process in which the African-Caribbean population was forced
back to work to both limit the economic losses of white elites and also “earn”
the relief they needed in the form of food and the materials to rebuild their
homes.3
The intertwining of labor and relief was by no means unique to British
responses to disaster in the Caribbean. It was a joining that occurred with pur-
pose throughout the Empire. Work schemes were deployed during the Irish
famine and in India throughout the nineteenth century (Davis 2000; Ó Gráda
2010:214). In Ireland, the starving were employed to build roads, quays, and
make other improvements to infrastructure. Similarwork schemeswere imple-
mented in India, but in a significantlymore punitivemanner; to receive rations
the starving were made to submit to living militarized work camps (Davis
2001:38–41). Nor was it unique to the Empire—the idea that participation in
work schemes was the most just way of determining the eligibility of the poor
for relief was an attitude that had long resided at the heart of Britain’s domes-
tic approach to poor relief and became its guiding principle following the 1834
Poor Law Amendment Act. Unlike in Ireland and India, no labor camps were
built in the Caribbean and, despite the frequency of disasters, in particular hur-
ricanes, the British never formalized any plans of response to these hazards.
Hurricaneswere not evenmentioned in the documentswritten by the Colonial
Office to aid governors preparing to take up positions in the region and adap-
tations such as the development of hurricane shelters, despite proven success,
were abandoned.4
Whilst white elites prepared little for disaster, across the long nineteenth
century their responses to disaster often unfolded in the same way. In prac-
tice, reflecting a punitive approach to domestic poor relief, they often made
relief for the suffering African-Caribbeans conditional on their participation in
3 This article is concerned with relief as it emerged in the immediate aftermath of disaster
and so, even though Britain did on occasion provide financial relief (notably after the Great
Hurricane of 1780 and the Barbadian hurricane of 1831) it usually arrived after protracted
negotiation. Consequently, when the term relief is used in this article it primarily refers to
the foodstuffs and building materials that were so often in short supply after these events.
4 Mulcahy 2006:128–29. The National Archives (hereafter TNA), London, CO 260/3 (St Vincent),
Correspondence, original-Secretary of State, Untitled file, an instruction guide for the incom-
ing Governor of St Vincent, 1783.
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work. This response to disaster was intended to reassert the “normal” order in
which African-Caribbeans labored for Whites. In the long nineteenth century,
this approach first took shape following the Barbadian hurricane of 1831.
On August 10, 1831 Barbados was hit by a devastating hurricane which
destroyed nearly all the island’s plantations and left the enslaved population
without shelter or food.5 In their communications with London, colonial offi-
cials wrote as if famine threatened all on the island; they wrote that they were
“destitute of the common necessaries of life” and other eye witnesses recorded
that the island was “menaced with the horrors of pestilence and famine.”6
Despite the supposed threat of universal famine, food supplies were arriving
at the island; not only were they not being distributed, they were actively being
turned away. From a report written on September 2, we know that provisions
arrived at Barbados from the Berbice region of British-controlledGuiana. From
the outset, these supplies were intended to be sold and not distributed freely
to the inhabitants. However, thesemuch-needed supplies nevermade it to Bar-
bados’s merchants and instead were turned away by John Drake, the planter
and council member charged with overseeing relief. In a report to the council,
Drake explained his actions saying that “[these supplies] were not required at
Barbados either by the troops or by the inhabitants, nor at any other station.”
He further reported that “they could not be housed anywhere, the sending of
them back was the most advantageous mode that could been adopted for the
public interest.” In consequence of this, Drake returned what he referred to as
“wholly unnecessary and unsolicited” provisions knowing full well that they
would spoil on their return to the Berbice region.7 There is nothing in Drake’s
correspondence that lays out a clearmotive for his actions.However, at the very
least his actions implicitly suggest that he did not consider it an appropriate
course of action to simply distribute the food directly from the boat it arrived
on. Furthermore, that he felt the provisions had to be “housed” suggests he had
a desire to exert some level of control over who could access them.
Considering the famine conditions reported directly after the hurricane,
Drake’s decision is striking. Turning away needed relief was not a common
course of action prior to 1831 and nor would it be after; there are only two
instances of it happening later in the nineteenth century. In 1837, Antigua’s leg-
islature turned down the delivery of water fromBarbados so as not to harm the
5 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 104.
6 TNA, CO 31/51, Barbados, General Assembly, September 6, 1831; Editor of the “West Indian,”
Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 6.
7 TNA, T1/4395 Long Papers, bundle 852, part 1:West Indies Relief, Drake to Stewart, February 17,
1832.
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island’s “honor” (Flannigan 1844:192–93). In 1831, there is little suggestion that
the island’s honor was at stake. It is also noteworthy that Drake, though lacking
a place to “house” the provisions, did not simply send themon to nearby St. Vin-
cent where, having been affected by the same hurricane, planters were report-
ing that “famine [was] staring [its] inhabitants in the face.”8 However, like on
Barbados, whilst Vincentian planters were raising the alarm about the possibil-
ity of famine in their communicationswith London, one of them, J. Colquhuon,
reported that, for thosewithmoney, therewere still some “scanty” supplies held
by the merchants.9
That on Barbados Drake was comfortable returning the provisions suggests
that whilst the provision grounds of the enslaved were destroyed, white elites
like those on St. Vincent had some other means of feeding themselves. The
remaining question is thenwhywould planters on both islands report impend-
ing famine conditions if Vincentian merchants held provisions and Barba-
dos was able to turn away supplies? This is in part explained by the fact that
planters sought to exaggerate the direness of their postdisaster circumstances
to enhance the chance that they would receive financial aid from Parliament.10
Perhaps above all though, had Drake simply distributed the provisions freely
the enslavedpopulationwouldhavehad little incentive to labor forwhite elites.
Distanced from the impact of food shortages, white elites prioritized return-
ing the enslaved population to work and restoring the plantation economy.
Eight days after the hurricane, Governor James Lyon issued a proclamation
in the Barbados Globe and Colonial Advocate that ordered householders who
owned slaves to search for them if they had left their plantations without per-
mission and put them to work cleaning Bridgetown’s streets.11 He also, in a
prelude to what would become common practice across the Caribbean post-
emancipation, ordered Whites to take any African-Caribbean person guilty of
vagrancy and put them towork at public works until they were picked up by an
overseer or their owner.12
In his communications with London, he explained the actions he took as
necessary because “without guidance” the enslaved were “always idle.”13 For
8 Royal St. Vincent Gazette, August 18, 1831.
9 Royal St. Vincent Gazette, August 18, 1831.
10 This trend towardover exaggeration is notedbyMulcahy (2006) and it continued through-
out the nineteenth century. The planters of St. Vincent in particular were known for their
“absurd” and “hyperbolic” reports; Parliamentary Papers (1831), House of Commons [197],
p. 18, Boson to Goderich, August 18, 1831.
11 Barbados Globe and Colonial Advocate, August 18, 1831.
12 Barbados Globe and Colonial Advocate, August 23, 1831.
13 Parliamentary Papers (1831), House of Commons [197], West Indies. Copies of dispatches
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the work of clearing roads, burying dead livestock and destroying putrefy-
ing vegetable matter, wages were paid, which functioned as a form of relief
because they facilitated the purchase of needed provisions. However, within
what appears as a straightforward attempt to restart African-Caribbean labor
and market exchange, there was nuance to the colonial approach to relief.
Wages for this work were not paid at a flat rate, but rather at different incre-
ments reflecting the usefulness of an individual to the colonial state. Day labor-
erswere to be paid two shillings and six pence per day, common carpenters and
masons three shillings and nine pence, and master workmen six shillings and
three pence.14The base amount of two shillings and six pence appears to reflect
the recommendations of the Jamaican consolidated Slave Act of 1792 (an act
intended to be adopted by other colonies), which bound planters to provide
provisions of that value for enslaved peoples without the land to feed them-
selves (Edwards 1793:190). It is worth noting that wages of this value were com-
paratively low compared to the average wage of a British agricultural worker in
this same year (in 1831, the average wage of an agricultural worker was eleven
shillings a day) (Bowley 1900:34). On Barbados, in normal circumstances, a sin-
gle pound of fish or porkwould have roughly cost a third of a day laborer’s wage
at these rates (Bayley 1833:149).What ismore, those on these wages would have
struggled to purchase food given that its price would have been inflated by the
hurricane-induced shortages.Whilst these wages would have had limited ben-
efits for those earning them, such an approach, by separating out workers and
advantaging some ahead of others, would have been effective at diffusing dis-
content with this mode of relief. This approach also benefitted white elites by
rebuilding the complex hierarchy of labor upon which their minority control
rested (Heuman 1997:138–68).
Lyon appears to have believed that those in the colonial office were as con-
cerned with African-Caribbean idleness as he and his fellow colonists were.
He stressed in his reports that though the enslaved had been idle, his actions
had rendered them “perfectly obedient to their masters,” and that both black
and white people were working together with “firmness and resignation.”15
Lyon reporting anything other than peaceful cooperation would have obvi-
ously caused those in Britain to reflect on his ability to perform his role. As
the days passed following the hurricane, Lyon’s dispatches continued in a
from Barbados, St Vincent and St Lucia, relating to the late hurricane in the West Indies,
p. 2, Lyon to Goderich, August 13, 1831.
14 Barbados Globe and Colonial Advocate, August 23, 1831.
15 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, pp. 77 and 117.
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tone that highlighted the cooperation of those on the island. On August 13,
he wrote that “all classes and all colors vied with each other in their haste
to contribute their mite towards relieving the wants of the poor and house-
less.”16 What Lyon was not reporting was that, despite the energies directed
toward coercing the African-Caribbean population back into labor, this effort
was not entirely successful and given that it remained the paramount concern
of white elites, more extreme steps than simply limiting access to relief were
taken.
In an eyewitness account titled An Account of the Fatal Hurricane by which
Barbados Suffered in 1831, the author contradicts Lyon’s dispatches by record-
ing that throughout the island there was large-scale plunder which, if left
unchecked, would have “involved this wretched country in all the miseries of
famine.”17 Colonel Hinds, the owner of the Spring Garden estate, reported that
authority was totally disregarded. Similarly, at the Black Bess plantation the
enslavedpeoplewere supposedly “very disorderly andusing threats.”18This per-
ceivedpatternof disobedience repeated itself round the islandand in response,
Whites were given carte-blanche power to flog any enslaved peoples who tried
to persuade their fellows that they need not work. The violence peaked when
an enslaved man was shot dead for striking a soldier.19
To the white elites witnessing these scenes, they must have appeared as a
manifestation of what theymost feared; the disruption to normal working pat-
terns and the privation caused by the hurricanewas precipitating challenges to
their authority. However, there is little to suggest that the perceived transgres-
sions of African-Caribbeans againstwhite rule constituted sparks of a potential
rebellion. The insight provided by the author of the Account into themorale of
the island’s population would suggest that an organized rebellion was far from
the minds of most:
The heart of each was surcharged with distress, the voice was paralyzed
and denied the power of utterance; neither could congratulate the other
on the safety of his life, or recite his disconsolate tale; but the silent, con-
vulsive grasp of the hand emphatically expressed “my affliction is greater
than I can bear!”20
16 Parliamentary Papers (1831), House of Commons [197], p. 2, Lyon to Goderich, August 13,
1831.
17 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 117.
18 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 118.
19 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 121.
20 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 39.
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In consequence of such descriptions, the discontent that erupted on vari-
ous plantations appears more as a manifestation of despair from an oppressed
people who, having endured the hurricane and the immense personal losses it
brought, were resistant to the oppression of slavery being so rapidly re-asserted
over their drastically altered circumstances. The absence of rebellious intent is
further evidenced by the fact that besides their idleness, their recorded crimes
were largely limited to the reaping of any corn left untouched by the hurri-
cane.21 Indeed, in the aftermath of the hurricane, the enslaved people of Barba-
dos appeared to have done little besides scavenge food from the island’s ruins.22
The island’s white elites did also attempt to hasten the return to normal
working patterns by trying to make what appeared initially as good-natured
appeals to the African-Caribbean population. A planter, Sir Reynold Alleyne,
dispatched around the island to quell unrest, attempted to placate enslaved
laborers by rhetorically undoing some of the racial otherization that normally
separatedWhites fromAfrican-Caribbeans.Onarriving at a plantation, Alleyne
said he came to the enslaved as a “friend” and informed them that it was only
due to their behavior that he was induced to bring a military force to restore
order. In an attempt to soothe discontent, he argued that the hurricane’s dam-
age created a “common distress” that “involved bothmaster and slave” and due
to which, like his own enslaved charges, they should act with “obedience and
attention.”23 He further stressed that the “uproar of the elements could not
sever the tie that existed between them and their owners, but that it ought, if
possible, to have united themmore strongly.”24 Alleyne’s remarks would prove
to be disingenuous, but that hemade them is suggestive of the level of concern
white elites had for their safety in the wake of the hurricane and the emphasis
they placed on labor as a remedy for challenges to their authority.
This attempt on the behalf of thewhite elites to bring theAfrican-Caribbean
population on side and quickly reinstate normal laboring routines was not a
new tactic. In his study of the 1816 rebellion, Lambert shows that one of the
initial responses of the island’s acting president was to issue a proclamation
that threatened summary punishments for all involved. This proclamation was
then followed by a second that was, in Lambert’s terms, “more conciliatory in
tone and policy” and offered a pardon to any enslaved peoples who were not
“principle instigators” of the rebellion (Lambert 2005:124). Lambert argues that
this switch in rhetoric was representative of the desire of white elites to restore
21 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 116.
22 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 120.
23 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 119.
24 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 119.
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the hierarchy betweenmaster and slave (Lambert 2005:125). In 1831, this rhetor-
ical tactic was used again; Lyon’s initial proclamation struck a harsh tone, but
as shown by Alleyne’s address, those actively involved in quelling the unrest
employed a more conciliatory tone to achieve their ultimate goal of restoring
the “normal” racial hierarchy.
Alleyne’s conciliatory tone was in reality a thin facade. It was a cover that
would be quickly droppedwhen it did not achieve its intended aim. The author
of the Account tells us that this address was met with “insolent language” and
agitation from certain “ringleaders.”25 As a show of his and the wider white
elite’s true intentions, Alleyne had the most disobedient offenders brought
forward and punished with fifty lashes. Quelling white fears of a contesta-
tion of their authority through the re-establishment of normal labor routines
assumed greatest paramountcy. In 1831, the link between work and relief was
clear. Needed relief was turned away thus ensuring that African-Caribbeans
were incentivized to labor for Whites and when they did not, violence was
meted out on them until they did.
2 Postemancipation Continuities
Though slavery ended in 1833, plantation agriculture did not nor did its dom-
inance of arable land. Though exports of sugar from the British Caribbean
stagnated in the period 1807–33, the plantation remained the central way in
which the British envisaged deriving profit from the region (Northrup 1995:18).
The system of apprenticeship that replaced slavery ensured the temporary sur-
vival of the plantation because it gave planters the right to at least 40 hours a
week of unpaid labor.26 The severity of the white response on Barbados in 1831
had been legal because the recipients of the violence were enslaved peoples.
WithAfrican-Caribbeans receiving greater legal protections via the apprentice-
ship system, some colonial legislatures appear to have been cognizant of how
this might limit their control over labor in a postdisaster situation. In Jamaica,
they tried to ensure continued control through legal change. In 1833, Governor
Howe Brown in his proclamation to newlymade apprenticesmade it clear that
despite new regulations that limited the amount of work they could bemade to
do to following a hurricane or an earthquake a plantation owner could require
themtowork for longer to ensure cropswereharvested.27 Evenwhere such legal
25 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 120.
26 Editor of the “West Indian,”Account of the Fatal Hurricane, p. 19.
27 Parliamentary Papers (1837), House of Commons [521], Papers in explanation of the mea-
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changeswerenotmade, the plantation’s survival as the central hubof labor and
thus white control meant that, after disasters, its restoration remained the pri-
mary concern of white elites.
In 1834, a hurricane hit the island of Dominica and destroyed nearly all
the plantations, the coffee crop, and half the sugar crop. The population was
largely reduced to scavenging food from the groundwhere it hadbeenuprooted
but otherwise survived the impact of the hurricane winds. The reverend of
St. George parish, George Clarke, said that these foodstuffs would only last
a fortnight, or at most three weeks, before famine was imminent.28 In these
circumstances, frustration on the part of the planters with African-Caribbean
idleness quickly emerged; in a report sent to London, planter, Dugald Laidlaw,
wrote:
The rich, respectable founders the planters [have] with every disposi-
tion sought to assist [the laborers] but that ever since the hurricane, the
negroes have been behaving ill, and have done little towards rebuilding
their houses—on which they have been exclusively employed. Finding
that my brother was nearly dead from being buried in the ruins of the
great house, they robbed and plundered everything they could lay their
hands upon.29
Though not explicitly suggestive of a concern about a full-scale rebellion, Laid-
law’s letter makes an implicit link between the inattentiveness of the African-
Caribbeanpopulation to labor and the transgressions againstWhites andwhite
property. From this quote we can also begin to see that these concerns were
not unique to Barbados nor to the period of slavery. On an island whose white
minority were dependent on African-Caribbean labor for their profit, these
concernswere always going to rear their head.That said, despite Laidlaw’s obvi-
ous distaste for the behavior of his apprenticed laborers he noted that feeding
them was an “unavoidable expense”; no doubt “unavoidable” because it was
essential to restarting the plantation economy.30
Like Barbados’s planters in 1831, the planters of Dominica responded to the
disruption caused by disaster by attempting to put African-Caribbean peo-
sures adopted by his Majesty’s Government for giving effect to the act for The Abolition
of Slavery throughout the British Colonies: Part 1. Jamaica, 1833–1835, p. 43.
28 TNA, T1/4397 Long Papers, bundle 852, part 3:West Indies relief, Extract of a letter sent by
Rev. George Clarke to (recipient not given), September 20, 1834.
29 TNA, T1/4397, Colquhoun to Rice, October 2, 1834.
30 TNA, T1/4397, Colquhoun to Rice, October 2, 1834.
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ples back to work. As Laidlaw writes, apprenticed laborers were employed in
the reconstruction of their own homes—something which perhaps reflected
a slight easing of colonial repression when compared with the more general
work tasks set on Barbados in 1831. However, the apprentices appeared to have
chafed at these orders, preferring instead to focus on the potentially more
pressing need to feed themselves. One Dominican planter wrote that his work-
ers implored him to let them attend to their cassavawhichwas beginning to rot
andwas, in his words, their “best stand by, as it may be preserved for any length
of time.”31
No doubt because the African-Caribbean population was now apprenticed
andnot enslaved, theywerenot subjected to anything like theharsh ordinances
that Governor Lyon issued in the aftermath of the Barbadian hurricane of 1831.
That said, the communications of the planters of Dominica show that they
were still concerned by African-Caribbean idleness. However, unlike their Bar-
badian counterparts, they appear to have understood that engaging in coercion
when foodstuffs were so low could have fomented discontent that would have
threatened their control. Over time, even those such as Laidlaw, who was ini-
tially reticent to engage with relief, wrote that he and other planters had begun
doing what they could to feed African-Caribbean children.32
In 1831, Whites first tried limiting access to relief to coerce African-
Caribbeans back into labor and then deployed force against thosewho resisted.
In 1834, force was not used, but as can be seen in the rhetoric of Laidlaw,
white preoccupation with African-Caribbean idleness remained. James Corlet,
speaker of the island’s assembly wrote of the need to have Dominica’s roads
cleared immediately to allow the laborers to leave the capital and return to their
places of work.33 In a further contrast with 1831, the white elites of Dominica
responded to the hurricane of 1834 with some compassion; Governor Evan
Macgregor called upon the island’s legislature to provide immediate shelter to
all those without homes. The difference between responses in 1831 and 1834 is
in part also explained by the fact that after extended conflict with Maroons,
the power of the island’s planters to violently enforce their will was weakened
(Craton 1982:232).
In 1831 and 1834 the proximate cause of conflict betweenwhite elites and the
African-Caribbean population was food shortages. When, on occasion, post-
31 TNA, T1/4397, Extract of letter from Rosalie Estate contained within Laidlaw to Gregg,
October 2, 1834.
32 TNA, T1/4397, Colquhoun to Rice, October 2, 1834.
33 TNA, CO 71/78 (Dominica) Correspondence, Original-Secretary of State: Despatches;
Offices and Individuals, James Corlet to Evan Macgregor, September 27, 1834.
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disaster circumstances were comparatively less desperate they did not imme-
diately change white elite preoccupation with labor and control, but did, over
time, foster less punitive responses to disaster. In 1843, an earthquake shook
Antigua leveling much of the capital St. Johns and destroying plantations
throughout the island. Typically, white elites initially feared that the destruc-
tion would drive the African-Caribbean population to commit widespread
pillage and thus they turned to established patterns of response.34 Governor
Charles Fitzroy summoned the magistrates, merchants and principal inhabi-
tants to the Government House where measures were resolved upon for the
security of property, special constables sworn in, and a detachment of the 47th
Regiment marched down to the Police Quarters to assist in cases of “neces-
sity.”35 Yet, the following day Fitzroy reported that “with only trifling exceptions
no attempt at plunder has been made.”
The lackof theperceived threatwas such thatGovernorFitzroy rode through
Antigua’s streets and country to assess the damage himself. Fitzroy went on
to report that “the conduct of the laboring population has been most praise-
worthy.”36 However, most striking is that, now in the receipt of wages, laborers
could have advantaged themselves by raising the price of their labor, but they
did not. In fact, representatives of that class stated that they would not use the
opportunity presented to them.37 Without colonial coercion all classes were
reported as having participated in at least the clearing of streets, disposal of
rubbish, and the pulling down of buildings. When compared to 1831 and 1834,
such cooperation appears miraculous, but the explanation is simple; unlike
those hurricanes, the earthquake did not rip crops from the soil and leave them
rotting in the deluge that followed. In 1843, therewere no food shortages, recov-
ery was difficult, but the immediate survival of the people was ensured and so
desperation and thus tension did not rise.White elites found no threat to their
authority and so punitive responses like those deployed in 1831 did not mani-
fest.
Though cooperation reigned in 1843, it is still important to note that the
initial response of white elites was to deploy force. Postslavery, it remained
the case that disaster sparked fear in the ruling class, not just because of the
34 Parliamentary Papers (1843), House of Commons [441], Antigua. Papers Relative to the
Earthquake in theWest Indies [Antigua], p. 3, Fitzroy to Stanley, February 10, 1843.
35 AntiguaWeekly Register, February 9, 1843.
36 Parliamentary Papers (1843), House of Commons [441], p. 3, Fitzroy to Stanley, February 10,
1843.
37 Parliamentary Papers (1843), House of Commons [441], p. 3, Fitzroy to Stanley, February 10,
1843.
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potential for material loss, but because its destruction could presage a chal-
lenge to their authority.White fears of rebellion remained acute because of the
demographic trajectory their desire for a large enslaved work force had set the
colonies on. On every island the African-Caribbean population outnumbered
them; between the years 1830–32, there were 684,400 enslaved Africans across
the Caribbean colonies in comparison to 32,500 slave-owningWhites (Higman
1995:74–100). These population imbalances explain why white elites were pre-
occupied with a desire to rapidly reassert their control in the aftermaths of
disaster, but they do not explain why, in 1831 and 1834, their focus lay on using
work to do that.
The preoccupation with work as a necessity for white control is reflective of
the tradition of the punitive poor relief in Britain. Michael Barnett argues in
his book Empire of Humanity that there was a direct linkage between the pas-
sage of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 and the construction of relief
in British colonies (Barnett 2011:63). Arguably, in the Caribbean, particularly in
the example of the 1831 hurricane, this linkage was present prior to the pas-
sage of the 1834 Act. Work as the determiner for eligibility for state relief had
a long history in Britain. The passage of the Workhouse Test Act in 1723 for-
mally initiated schemes that mandated that the poor work for their relief. But
itwasnot until 1834 that theywere expandedwholesale andadopted as the cen-
tral pillar of poor relief (Slack 1995:33). At the turn of the nineteenth century,
informed by commentators such as Thomas Malthus, there was growing elite
preoccupation with the idle poor to which the Amendment of 1834 emerged as
a solution. In 1831 and to a degree 1834, workwas similarly deployed as the solu-
tion to idleness, but there are importantnuances to theuseof such tactics in the
Caribbean that mean they do not constitute a simple mirroring of approach.
In the Caribbean, idleness was part of a wider racialized discourse directed
toward the African-Caribbean population. In contrast to the British poor who
could work their way out of idleness, this trait was seen to be inherent in the
imagined concept of the African race. Thus, through this important nuance,
we can also understand that, as this article will go on to show, a preoccu-
pation with idleness remained at the core of British responses to disaster
across the long nineteenth century. Jonathan Dalby, in his article “Such a Mass
of Disgusting and Revolting Cases,” argues that in the postemancipation era,
racial stereotyping of African-Caribbean peoples as inherently “lazy” remained
ever present and if anything increased because of the loss of power planta-
tion owners felt (Dalby 2015:144). The term quashee was a common descrip-
tor for African-Caribbean peoples who were perceived as being “naturally”
idle without white guidance. The term was used before the ending of slav-
ery but gained wider use after Thomas Carlyle used it repeatedly in his infa-
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mous essay “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question.”38 Dalby suggests
that even if they had differing levels of optimism for the Caribbean’s future
planters, colonial officials and missionaries agreed that, because of the per-
ceived accuracy of the quashee stereotype, British involvement was essential
to guiding the development of the African-Caribbean peoples. Though not
unique to the Caribbean, it is in this context that we can see the role race
played in creating a point of divergence from domestic poor relief and thus
understand why idleness remained a central preoccupation of British disaster
response.
3 Relief in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
Though a hurricane caused damage toTobago in 1847, it paled in comparison to
thedamageexperiencebyBarbados andDominica in 1831 and 1834 respectively.
In 1866 the Bahamas was hit by a destructive hurricane, but because planta-
tions were not the islands’ main source of income and the African-Caribbean
population was dispersed across the archipelago there was no major British
response to the disaster. What is more, the islands recovered quickly; many
people, white and black, directed themselves to the scavenging of shipwrecks
caused by the hurricane, the profits from which returned the islands to pros-
perity (Neely 2011). It was not until 1898 that a British colony would again face
disaster on such a scale that it necessitated a full-scale response from a colony’s
governing class. The year 1898 in factmarked the beginning of a period inwhich
the British-controlled Caribbean faced a spate of particularly destructive disas-
ters. British responses to disaster in this period continued to exhibit a focus on
African-Caribbean idleness, but they also drewmore explicitly on the language
and frameworks of domestic poor relief.
In 1898 the Windward Islands were hit by a hurricane, which wrought the
most damage on St. Vincent and Barbados. On both these islands, following
the near destruction of plantations, homes, and crops, the laboring population
became quickly reliant on the colonial authorities for aid. Though forthcom-
ing, from the outset those authorities explicitly sought to control who could
draw on relief, preventing access to all except those who would labor for them.
On St. Vincent, the island’s governorAlfredMoloney authorized indiscriminate
relief for two days, after which those the authorities deemed fit to work were to
38 ThomasCarlyle, “OccasionalDiscourseon theNegroQuestion,”Fraser’sMagazine forTown
and Country, vol. 40, February 1849.
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be denied access to further relief.39 Barbadians were not even given two days
of indiscriminate relief, Governor James Hay ordered that unless employment
was impossible “no … relief should be given.”40
A key concern underpinning the development of the 1834 Amendment had
been to design relief in a manner that obviated dependence on state welfare.
Unlike in 1831, 1834, and 1843, that concern surfaced in 1898 and tookonelevated
importance given recent poor assessments of the region’s finances, thus mark-
ing a greater linkage betweendomestic andBritishCaribbean relief.41Moloney,
in private correspondence, wrote of his gratification in seeing the number of
those able to claim relief being reduced and stressed his intent to investigate
the “bona fides” of each case.42 After the two days of indiscriminate relief he
drew up harsh guiding principles for those involved in the distribution of aid,
which ordered officials to cease providing relief to any temporarily disabled
person as soon as was possible. These guidelines also stated that the only cir-
cumstance inwhich distributors couldmake immediate remittanceswaswhen
starvation was imminent.43
Though it was a continuity by no means unique to the Caribbean, we can
see that, despite the fact that white elites did not use violence as they had in
1831, little had changed in the principles they used to provide relief. If anything,
drawing more explicitly on domestic policy as they were, they appear more
committed to limiting African-Caribbean access. Despite the distance from
slavery, the fear of disruption to labor precipitating a challenge towhite author-
ity remained their central preoccupation.Moloney, in correspondencewith the
Colonial Office, wrote that making the African-Caribbean population work for
relief was necessary to avoid the “wholesale demoralization of the populous.”44
39 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205], West Indies. Correspondence
relating to the Hurricane on 10th–12th September 1898, and the Relief of the Distress
Caused Thereby, p. 17, Moloney to Chamberlain, September 29, 1898.
40 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205], West Indies. Correspondence
relating to the Hurricane on 10th–12th September 1898, and the Relief of the Distress
Caused Thereby, p. 74, Acting GovernorWilliams to Chamberlain, November 25, 1898.
41 West India Royal Commission, Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Botanic Gar-
dens, Kew), 1897, pp. 131 and 343–44.
42 Parliamentary Papers (1899), House of Commons [C.9550], West Indies. Further Corre-
spondence relating to the Hurricane on 10th–12th September 1898, and the Relief of the
Distress Caused Thereby, p. 16, Moloney to Chamberlain, February 15, 1899.
43 Parliamentary Papers (1899), House of Commons [C.9550], West Indies. Further Corre-
spondence relating to the Hurricane on 10th–12th September 1898, and the Relief of the
Distress Caused Thereby, p. 16, Moloney to Chamberlain, February 15, 1899.
44 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 15, Moloney to Chamberlain, September 29, 1898.
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In his words, work was the remedy to the “threat” posed by an able-bodied,
African-Caribbeanpopulation “with nothing to do.”45 African-Caribbeanswere
set to work repairing roads, clearing debris, and rebuilding the banks of low-
lying agricultural works flooded with saltwater, and though they were paid for
thiswork, theirwages, because of wider geopolitical circumstances, were insuf-
ficient for the purchase of foodstuffs.46
As has been the case onBarbados 1831, the hurricane of 1898 destroyedmuch
of the edible crops on St. Vincent and Barbados. The typical posthurricane
food shortages were further exacerbated by already depleted crops owing to a
large drought that had afflicted the region in themonths prior to the hurricane
season. Consequently, on St. Vincent and Barbados both governors became
quickly entirely reliant on imported foodstuffs to feed the population.47 How-
ever, ongoingwar between Spain and the United States had increased the price
of imported food by around 20 percent.48 As a result, three months after the
hurricane, many cases of destitution still existed.49 Yet, despite the observable
failure of the work schemes to actually provide relief, the colonial desire to see
the laboring population returned to employment reigned supreme. Moloney
worked stringently to reduce the number of those still requiring relief, reallo-
cating many sufferers a pauper dole normally set at four shillings per month.50
He then reduced this dole to three shillings, an amount which he privately
admitted was ‘barely sufficient to support existence’ but argued that it would
have the beneficial effect of forcing dependents to seek work.51
Muchas thewhite elite preoccupationwithmakingAfrican-Caribbean labor
for relief persisted, so too did the stereotypes regarding their inherent idleness.
Only a month after the hurricane, a visiting Naval Officer, J.L. Burr, referred
45 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205], West Indies. Correspondence
p. 79, Moloney to Chamberlain, December 7, 1898.
46 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205], West Indies. Correspondence
p. 35, Moloney to Chamberlain, October 17, 1898.
47 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 15, Moloney to Chamberlain, September 29, 1898.
48 CO 28/248 (Barbados) Colonial Office: Letters received from various government offices
(departments), other organizations and individuals relating to Barbados, Williamson to
Chamberlain, June 14, 1898.
49 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 81, Moloney to Chamberlain, December 7, 1898.
50 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 81, Moloney to Chamberlain, December 7, 1898.
51 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 81, Moloney to Chamberlain, December 7, 1898.
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to those still immiserated by the hurricane as “negro-loafers.”52 Loafers who
“would not work even if they were offered employment” (a tacit acknowledge-
ment that there was no work) and were quite prepared to incite others to acts
of social unrest.53 Similarly, twomonths on from the storm,Moloney, unhappy
with the rate of their rebuilding, personally traveled around St. Vincent to deter
the African-Caribbean population from becoming dependent on relief argu-
ing that if they were to expect any relief, they must rebuild their own homes
faster.54 However, it was colonial priorities if anything that delayed the rebuild-
ing of these houses. The island, as it had long been since the seventeenth cen-
tury, was reliant on imported timber, imports that took time to reach the island
and arrived in limited quantities. Consequently, in an attempt to prevent the
rebuilding of the plantations falling behind, Moloney limited the amount of
timber laboring households could draw on to eighty foot; an amount he pri-
vately acknowledged as “far from ideal.”55 Still suffering in the aftermath of the
1898 hurricane, onMay 6, 1902 St. Vincent was hit by another setback when the
island’s volcano, La Soufrière, erupted for the first time since 1812. Even with a
change of governor, the British relief effort in 1902 demonstrates that with the
advent of the twentieth century, British Caribbean relief remained a space for
punitive governance.
Following the eruption, the colonial authorities focused on pressing labor-
ers into burying bodies to avert the spread of disease. Although this was an
understandable precaution, focus on this work came at the expense of provid-
ing relief. Private correspondence shows that in the months that followed the
eruption, Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain and Llewe-
lyn agreed that relief needed to be curtailed and that that should done through
a “labor test.” Drawing directly on the language of domestic poor relief, they
agreed that all those who were aged sixteen and above and who were “able-
bodied” should be refused relief.56
52 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 43, Admiralty to Colonial Office, October 20, 1898.
53 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 43, Admiralty to Colonial Office, October 20, 1898.
54 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 58, Moloney to Chamberlain, November 10, 1898.
55 Parliamentary Papers (1898), House of Commons [C.9205],West Indies. Correspondence,
p. 62, Moloney to Chamberlain, November 25, 1898.
56 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], West Indies. Further corre-
spondence relating to the volcanic eruptions in St Vincent and Martinique, in 1902 and
1903, p. 79, Llewelyn to Chamberlain, November 25, 1902.
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With clear lineage from the conditions imposed on relief in 1898, “able-
bodied persons” were only able to receive relief in return for bona fide labor.57
What was considered bona fide were tasks that benefitted the colonial state:
improving and repairing infrastructure or participation in agricultural tasks.
When these works ended but suffering remained, private interests sought to
take advantage of the distress. In a proposal to the Vincentian authorities, rep-
resentatives of the Rowntree estate proposed taking those still in need of relief
and setting them to work upgrading the roads of their Dominican estates.58
Similarly, Mr. A. Porter, a Vincentian estate owner, argued that with the lack of
labor posing a dangerous threat to the island, the authorities should give him
a portion of the relief money so he could employ the “excitable” population in
the restoration of his estate.59
This brazen opportunism marks a development from earlier work-for-relief
schemes where the colonial authorities set African-Caribbeans to work clear-
ing and repairing damage done by disasters. However, it does not appear to
have been a sustained development and it seems more reflective of the spe-
cific circumstances following the 1902 eruption. In contrast to the hurricane of
1898, which swept the whole island, in 1902 the eruption largely only affected
the northern portion of the island, leaving the homes and places of employ-
ment for many untouched (Ober 1904:194). Because the destruction was not as
total as it had been following disasters in 1831, 1834, and 1898 for example, food
shortages were not widespread, and there was a smaller group of sufferers who
could be exploited without provoking the mass unrest that Whites so feared.
Indeed, the death toll reached approximately 1600 peoplemany of whomwere
working on plantations at the base of the volcano andwere killed outright. Half
of those who were injured suffered such severe burns that they died within a
week.60
57 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], West Indies. Further corre-
spondence relating to the volcanic eruptions in St Vincent and Martinique, in 1902 and
1903, p. 81, The Earl of Onslow to Llewelyn, November 26, 1902.
58 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], West Indies. Further corre-
spondence relating to the volcanic eruptions in St Vincent and Martinique, in 1902 and
1903, p. 98,Messrs. Rowntree and Company Limited to Colonial Office, December 12, 1902.
59 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], West Indies. Further corre-
spondence relating to the volcanic eruptions in St Vincent and Martinique, in 1902 and
1903, p. 38, Porter to Llewelyn, September 12, 1902.
60 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1768–8], St Vincent. Colonial Re-
ports—annual, p. 25; Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], p. 90,
Llewelyn to Chamberlain, August 2, 1902.
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In the areas affected by the volcano’s lava and ash, the property damage was
severe. Perversely, this situation appears to have encouraged Governor Llewe-
lyn to create stricter stipulations for compensation claims. In the week that
followed the eruption, he contacted the Colonial Office to assure that he was
“weed[ing] out those undeserving of aid.”61 He dictated therewas to be no com-
pensation for the loss of earning power through the destruction of crops.62
Furthermore, he ordered that, for a claim to be made, the claimant had to
renounce his/her ownership of the land, so it could be vested in the Crown.63
These rules mark an escalation in the strictness of British relief, and although
not explicitly, they clearly reflect a desire to make claiming aid as undesirable
as possible, not unlike the intent of British poor relief.64
For the first time in the history of British responses to disaster, the strict-
ness of these rules was subject to complaint fromWhites. TwoWesleyan min-
isters James Darrell and Thomas Huckerby, who were deemed “mischievous”
interferers by Llewelyn, took particular issue with the fact that the governor
had restricted the distribution of provisions that had arrived from the United
States.65 Where, for lack of men to guard the provisions, in 1831 Drake had
simply returned donations. Llewelyn was able to lock the U.S. donations in
warehouses and pay, out of the relief fund, for police to guard them.66 These
actions which Darrell called a “violation of trust” are a clear manifestation
of the recurrent British desire to limited access to relief in which providing
genuinely needed assistance took a back seat. By retaining control over the
U.S. aid, Llewelyn was able to incentivize the African-Caribbean population to
work and, through the sale of the provisions, reinvigorate market forces in the
colony.67 Some provisions were later sold to the population at a profit to the
colonial state, but, reflecting the low priority Llewelyn assigned to providing
actual relief, most of the foodstuffs were left to rot.68
61 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], p. 29, Enclosure no. 1 in
Administrator Cameron to Colonial Office, telegram, May 23, 1902.
62 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], p. 19, Llewelyn to Chamber-
lain, August 2, 1902.
63 Parliamentary Papers (1904), House of Commons [Cd.1783], p. 19, Llewelyn to Chamber-
lain, August 2, 1902.
64 In Britain, the principle of “less eligibility” was used to ensure that conditions for claiming
relief were always worse than those outside of the workhouse, thus deterring claimants.
65 TNA, CO 321/218 (St Vincent), Dispatches from Governor R.B. Llewelyn, St Vincent, Llewe-
lyn to Chamberlain, January 26, 1903.
66 “Protest against Llewelyn,” Sentry, October 17, 1902.
67 TNA, CO 321/218, “Protest by theunofficialmembers of the legislative council of StVincent”,
January 29, 1903.
68 “Protest against Llewelyn,” Sentry, October 17, 1902.
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4 Relief in the Urban Environment
Even though the format of British responses to disaster in the Caribbean was
never formally codified and was regularly overseen by different governors who
were often dealing with different disasters, ensuring that African-Caribbean
peoples were coerced into laboring for the colonial state remained the central
guiding principle of relief. On January 14, 1907 Jamaica was hit by a powerful
earthquake that affected points along its southeastern coast, but it causedmost
damage to the island’s capital Kingston. Reflecting the characteristic belief of
the white elites that disaster would precipitate a challenge to their authority,
their first response was to deploy the West India Regiment and place the city
“practically under martial law.”69
Quickly, however, the colonial preoccupation with getting the African-
Caribbean population back to work surfaced. Where possible African-Carib-
bean peoples were put to work in the business of pulling down buildings
and clearing rubble and were incentivized to do so by a temporary doubling
of wages to allow them to purchase needed foodstuffs. However, as early as
January 17, the island’s governor Alexander Swettenham detailed his annoy-
ance with the slow progress of these employment schemes and suggested that
the “indisposition” of the laboring population was to blame.70 The parallels
between indisposition and idleness are clear; both functioned as a racial cri-
tique of African-Caribbeans’ unwillingness to immediately engage in danger-
ous labor having suffered losses of life and property. Despite the dangers, some
did participate, and a British observer noted that “where there was efficient
direction the ordinary laborers worked with a will.”71 However, an American
account provides a different perspective which indicates that some degree of
force was used; Admiral Charles Davis observed African-Caribbeans pressed
into work gangs under armed guard.72 Gang labor was central to the function
of plantations and that this form of labor was reasserted in central Kingston
where individualized work was the norm is telling of the anxiety white elites
69 The Tribune, January 18, 1907; Jamaican Archives Records Department, E.A. Hodges, “The
Secret History of the Earthquake.”
70 Parliamentary Papers (1907), House of Commons [Cd.3560], Jamaica. Correspondence
Relating to the Earthquake at Kingston, Jamaica, on 14th January 1907, p. 27, Swettenham
to Grey, January 17, 1907.
71 C.L. Chenery, “The Jamaican Earthquake,” reprinted from the Barbados Advocate, Jan-
uary 23, 24, and 25, 1907, p. 6.
72 TNA, CO 137/661 (Jamaica) Letters from the Foreign Office (March to December 1907) and
“miscellaneous offices,” Howard to Grey, February 4, 1907.
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felt in regard to their control over the African-Caribbean population (Welch
2002:274). Perhaps further explaining their reticence to engage with this work
is the fact that, whilst wages were technically doubled, laborers were actually
paid with orders to be fulfilled at a later point. This not only required trusting
that the colonial authorities would fulfil the orders, but also limited purchases
to vendors who would accept the orders.
As has been shown to be the case in nearly all of the disasters consid-
ered in this article, the perceived insouciance of the African-Caribbean pop-
ulation in the aftermath of disaster was typically highlighted to justify the
harsh treatment directed toward them. This was no different in 1907, but in
the close, racially mixed environment of urban Kingston it became a tool
used to separate the actions of usually “brave” Whites from their idle African-
Caribbean counterparts. A white British eyewitness Major Chown related that
directly after the earthquake “the black and colored population were stupefied
with terror and amazement,” but that at once they became “quite apathetic”
and were to be found “lounging in the streets … although labor [was] still in
demand.”73
Characteristic of British Caribbean relief, work-for-relief schemes in 1907
eschewed the formal labor camps elsewhere in the Empire. However, theywere
still convened around the idea that they were to return Kingston’s population
to “sturdy independence,” independence being the opposite of the dependence
so abhorred in British domestic policy (Sharma 2001:141). Furthermore, like in
1902, only two weeks on from the disaster, the governor was privately writing
of his intent to curtail the free distribution of food, and also to limit the cost of
foodstuffs for those purchasing with the orders earned through colonial work
schemes.74 From February 8 onward, any claimants for food were subjected
to characteristically “stringent” background checks that, in line with British
trepidation over welfare dependency, were implemented with the sole pur-
pose of disqualifying asmany claimants as possible.75 This arrangement clearly
embodied many aspects of domestic welfare thinking and shows the central-
ity of work as an organizing principle for British Caribbean relief. Swetten-
ham’s relief program limited free handouts, incentivized work, and by exten-
73 Parliamentary Papers (1907), House of Commons [Cd.3560], p. 99, Admiralty to Colonial
Office, February 26, 1907.
74 Parliamentary Papers (1907),House of Commons [Cd.3560], p. 35, SwettenhamtoColonial
Office, February 1, 1907.
75 Parliamentary Papers (1907), House of Commons [Cd.4586], Jamaica. Further Correspon-
dence Relating to the Earthquake at Kingston, Jamaica, on 14th January 1907, pp. 57–58,
Appendix V, General Relief Committee, p. 25.
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sion resuscitated private enterprise. Tying relief to labor in this manner forced
the laboring population to comeunder colonial control to ensure their survival.
Providing effective relief for Kingston’s African-Caribbean population in the
immediate aftermath of the earthquake assumed low priority for Swettenham
because white attitudes to African-Caribbean life had changed little since the
period of slavery. JohnHarrison has suggested that it was not until well into the
twentieth century that white elites considered African-Caribbean peoples “of
primary humanitarian concern” (Harrison 2011:57). During slavery, “welfare” so
far as it existed was regarded as a private obligation of planters andmerchants,
nominally comprising subsistence and rudimentary health care to sustain the
productivity of predominantly forced labor (Harrison 2011:55). An article pub-
lished in a Barbadian newspaper in 1900 shows us how common these views
remained; a planter wrote: “if a Negro’s house is destroyed by fire or tempest,
how long do you think it will take him to build another? Nature will give him
food almost for the asking” (Richardson 1986:11). Implicit in this comment is the
suggestion that because African-Caribbean living conditions were considered
basic it lessened state responsibility toward them. Particularly in periods of
crisis, this comment tacitly suggests that it was acceptable to leave the African-
Caribbean population to fend for themselves.
Only in the weeks that followed the earthquake when white fears of civil
disobedience had subsided did the relief effort take a less punitive turn. Food
distribution centers were established throughout Kingston and they served
approximately 3400 people a day; this food was initially provided indiscrim-
inately without condition. However, it was lacking; LesliesWeekly regarded the
rations being distributed as “meagre,” consisting of only “two potatoes, a piece
of bread and some brown sugar and molasses.”76 This was not for lack of sup-
plies, as Admiral Davis reported that, despite the fact that many of Kingston’s
population were suffering from hunger, barrels of flour, rice, and maize lay
strewn across the private Royal Mail Wharf. Davis offered to use these ingredi-
ents to bake bread for distribution to the hungry but was rebuffed.77 Even with
Davis’s offer rejected, the colonial authorities could have fed the hungry; their
private correspondence with the Colonial Office indicates there were large
swathes of crops that remained unharmed across the island.78 Yet, it appears
that temporarily redirecting food for export to feed Kingston remained out
76 “After the fury of the earthquake in Kingston: a multitude of the homeless and destitute,
without shelter and scantily supplied with food, and some peculiar effects of the shocks,”
LesliesWeekly, February 21, 1907, p. 173.
77 TNA, CO 137/661, Howard to Grey, February 4, 1907.
78 TNA, CO 137/662, McNeil to Grey, February 7, 1907.
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of the question. Even when the colonial authorities attempted a less punitive
relief effort, theywere unable or unwilling tomake full use of the supplies avail-
able to them.
5 Conclusion
Ultimately, this article has shown that above all British responses to disaster in
the period 1831–1907were guided by a desire to obviate the threat that they per-
ceived disasters posed to their control. They saw their minority control as rest-
ing on their ability to control African-Caribbean labor. Therefore, they sought
to coerce that population back into labor by making their access to relief con-
ditional on their willingness to work. Even when, as was the case following the
1907 earthquake, the plantation economy was no longer so central to colonial
profit, controlled access to relief by way of labor schemes and conditions was
clearly the way the colonial authorities felt it was best to reinstate the social
and racial hierarchy in a time of crisis.Wage labor reactivated themarket forces
of supply and demand, something which again aided efforts to re-assert colo-
nial control. Similarly, throughout periodic famines in British-controlled India,
Indians were forced into work schemes to prevent them becoming “indolent,
vagabonds, or vagrants.” As was common throughout Britain’s empire, work
was perceived as morally beneficial; it ameliorated perceived racial character-
istics that were seen to clash with colonial goals.
Across the long nineteenth century, the British approach to relief did de-
velop a greater linkage with domestic poor relief policy. From 1898 to 1907
muchof the languageusedbywhite elites directlymirrored that used to catego-
rize paupers in Britain and whilst military force was used less frequently when
compared with 1831, relief becamemore explicitly punitive. That said, because
white elites always viewed their control as contingent on having African-
Caribbeanpeoples labor for themand/or the colonial state, there is still a strong
continuity in the British approach to disaster relief through the periods of slav-
ery, apprenticeship, and freedom. Though relief practices were never governed
by a formally codified set of rules, British relief remained organized around a
desire to obviate idleness in the African-Caribbean population and by exten-
sion restore the plantations and profit-making industries that remained the
central British priorities in the region.
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